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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
APPEAL AND ERROR-RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM INVOLUNTORY NONSUIT-
[Missouri].-In two recent Missouri cases, the court marked the word
"given" on a peremptory instruction requested by the defendant at the close
of the plaintiff's case. Before this instruction was read to the jury, the
plaintiff excepted to this ruling and took a nonsuit. The Supreme Court
held that this nonsuit was involuntary and that an appeal would lie there-
from.'
This decision authoritatively settles a point disputed by the Missouri
appellate courts. In the only other cases having the same factual set-up
as the instant cases, the Kansas City Court of Appeals had held the non-
suit to be involuntary,2 whereas the St. Louis Court of Appeals had held
it to be voluntary.3
The plaintiff can take an involuntary nonsuit only when he is con-
strained by an adverse ruling of the court such as would preclude recovery
in the case.4 The St. Louis Court of Appeals seems to have thought that
the marking of the word "given" on the instruction was not such an adverse
ruling, and that the formality of reading the instruction to the jury must
have occurred before the plaintiff may take an involuntary nonsuit.5 The
conclusion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals was based upon a series of
cases which had held that a mere expression or intimation of the court's
intent to give a peremptory instruction for the defendant was insufficient
to constitute the record basis for an involuntary nonsuit and that such
instruction must actually be read to the jury.6 The facts of these cases,
however, distinguish them from the instant cases because the Supreme
Court deemed that the trial court had done more than merely manifest an
intent to give the instruction. It was ruled that the marking of the instruc-
tion as "given" by the trial court was equivalent to an actual reading to
the jury.7
1. Boonville Nat. Bank v. Thompson, 99 S. W. (2d) 93 (Mo., 1936);
Arp v. Rogers, 99 S. W. (2d) 103 (Mo. 1936). See R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 967.
2. Craven v. Midland Milling Co., 241 S. W. 658 (Mo. 1922); Poynter v.
Fogel Const. Co., 289 S. W. 30 (Mo. 1926).
3. Owens v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 85 S. W. (2d) 193 (Mo.
1935); Kane v. Kaysing Iron Works, 89 S. W. (2d) 532 (Mo. 1936).
4. Greene County Bank v. Gray, 146 Mo. 568, 48 S. W. 447 (1898);
Diamond Rubber Co. v. Wernicke, 148 S. W. 160 (Mo. 1912); 1 Houts,
Missouri Pleading and Practice (1936) sec. 330.
5. Supra, note 3.
6. The St. Louis Court of Appeals cited the following cases: Greene
County Bank v. Gray, 146 Mo. 568, 48 S. W. 447 (1898); McClure v.
Campbell, 148 Mo. 96, 49 S. W. 881 (1899) ; Carter v. O'Neill, 102 Mo. App.
391, 76 S. W. 717 (1903); Lewis v. Center Creek Mining, 97 S. W. 938
(Mo. 1906) ; Gray v. Ward, 234 Mo. 291, 136 S. W. 405 (1911) ; National
Live Stock Commission Co. v. Thero, 154 Mo. App. 508, 135 S. W. 961(1911); Segall v. Garlichs, 313 Mo. 406, 281 S. W. 693 (1926); Hogan-
Sunkel Heating Co. v. Bradley, 320 Mo. 185, 7 S. W. (2d) 255 (1928).
7. Supra, note 1.
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The decisions of the Supreme Court are heightened in significance par-
ticularly in those situations where, unless the appealing parties were en-
titled to review as on an involuntary nonsuit, the filing of a new suit would
be barred by the Statute of Limitations.8
This decisive declaration by the Supreme Court not only clarifies a matter
of technical procedure, but also removes the injustice of denying the right
to appellate review, because of non-conformance to what was, at best an
arbitrary and fictional requirement, i. e., the actual reading of the per-
emptory instruction to the jury which had no more than a ministerial func-
tion to perform. 9
ATTORNEYS-PRACTICE OF LAYMEN BEFORE ADmINISTRATIvE TRIBUNALS-
CONCURRENT REGULATORY POWERS OF JUDICIAL AND LEGSATIvB DEPART-
MENTS.-[Missouri] .- The Missouri Supreme Court, in a recent decision,1
was confronted with the question whether statutes regulating the practice of
law constitute an encroachment upon the power of the courts to define and
regulate the practice of law. The three unlicensed lay respondents admitted
that they had appeared before the Public Service Commission, a statutory
tribunal, representing parties litigant for a valuable consideration. The
court en bane decided unanimously that the respondents were in contempt
of court. Two judges reached this conclusion without applying a statute
which made the respondents' behavior a crime.2 The majority, in a well
written opinion by Chief Justice Ellison, held that the statute was a valid
manifestation of the legislative police power, and also that it furnished a
norm by which the court could judge persons accused of contempt for prac-
ticing law illegally. The majority also stated that if a statute should frus-
trate the administration of justice, the statute would be ignored.
In Re Richardss recognized that the Supreme Court has inherent power
to define and regulate the practice of law, and has original jurisdiction to
disbar attorneys. This involves the correlative power to prevent unauthor-
ized persons from practicing law. The respondents in the instant case
apparently contended that this judicial power was exclusive and therefore
that the General Assembly could not by legislation enter any field reached
by the court in the exercise of its inherent powers.
This theory of the respondents was accepted in 1909 in the Gilderslceve
case,4 which held that the courts have unlimited power to punish for con-
8. R. S. Mo. 1929, sees. 850, 860-864.
9. State ex rel. Witte Hardware Co. v. McElhinney, 100 S. W. (2d) 36
(Mo. App. 1937).
1. Clark v. Austin; Same v. Coon; Same v. Hull, 101 S. W. (2d) 977
(1937) (original proceedings in the Missouri Supreme Court).
2. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 11693.
3. 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933).
4. C., B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170, 181, 118 S. W. 86, 16
Ann. Cas. 749 (1909).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss4/16
